The Thriftiness of Nature and the Stability of Society

(second edition)

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The present thoughts consider the stratification of ssociety with respect to two categories of people, completely independent of the social background and social status of their bearers.
We have shown that the categorisation of personalities according to Confucius and Heidegger is directly related to two complementary types of self-identification of a person:

- with the being-self-identification (self-identification through what a person achieves / creates by <u>himself/herself</u>, what he/she is able to do), and
- with the having-self-identification (the self-identification by the affiliation of a person to a group/environment, by his or her "membership": locality, confession, company, club, association or other external attributes).

The present analysis has led us to the conclusion that the stratification of society is not accidental, but is based on statistical necessity, because it is a direct consequence of the Principle of Least Resources Consumption of Nature.

The conducted analysis showed that commonly accessible social networks directly influence norm-setting procedures in a socium.
It turned out that for setting a norm in a socium, where this norm has found an echo among several "listeners", no external motivation is required to ensure its enforcement. Thus, a "norm-setting socium" emerges that shares the norm.
It has been shown that egalitarian social networks, though directly influence procedures of norm-setting in a socium, nevertheless are unable to establish consensus on a complex set of norms.
We have come to the conclusion that a set of norms <u>sufficient for the long-term stability of society</u> can only be set and enforced in a socium by a "leadership personality", i.e. a person acting according to his/her principles and being in an "authoritative position", in which he/she has sufficient resources to set norms and ensure their enforcement.
The importance of the content and of an adequate application of the statute of a socium (e.g. a constitution) to ensure its long-term stability was also demonstrated.

Compared to the first edition, we have added a chapter on Cognitive Empathy and slightly reworked the rest of the chapters.

This article addresses the circle of readers interested in questions of sociology in general and of systemic approach.

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1 Stratification of society as a statistical necessity

Confucius[1] distinguished between two categories of people: "noble men"[2] and "petty men"[3]. He presumed that "the noble man is a man of justice, the common – a man of profit".

It is important to emphasize that Confucius distinguished specifically between categories of people, completely independent of the social origin and social status of their bearers; i.e. the representatives of these categories can be found both in social "lower classes" and in "upper classes".

Further characteristics of "noble (men)" and "petty / common (men)", which Confucius ascribed them, can be found in the Annex.

In this context, some interesting questions arise: "What is the distribution of these categories of people[4] in society and what does it depend on? Does this distribution of categories of people represent a stable state within society? "

An attempt to answer these questions is documented below.

Let us begin with the following observation: The fewer internal or external factors, e.g. ethical, that restrict a person, the greater his/her freedom of choice, i.e. the greater the range of possible choices he or she can consider and make.

Any possible decision to achieve a certain goal in one or another way presupposes a specific *relation* between the object of the effort (substrate, matter) and the character of that effort (property, information).

Let us illustrate this assertion with the example of the education system. The "substrate" in this system is students, the "property" - the subject matter to be taught, and the "relation" is the process of interaction of this subject matter with the minds of the students, i.e. the knowledge transfer process itself. This knowledge transfer process includes - besides the direct transfer of knowledge - the students' reaction to the transfer, and the observation of this reaction by the teacher, and the teacher's reaction to the students' reaction.
The character of this *relation* (interaction) is decisively influenced[5][6]by didactic principles.

Same goal within the education system - to transform teaching material into students'

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[1]"A great treasure awaits you in old age: your past."
"If you hate, you've been defeated"
"One should not fear change: They happen most when they are necessary" - Confucius

[2] CHI: 君子 *(jūnzǐ)*; RU: благородный муж; DE: edler Mann; EN: also superior man / lord's son / gentleman

[3] CHI: 小人 *(xiǎorén)*; RU: мелкий/низкий/ничтожный человек; DE: kleiner Mann

[4] "petty men" and "noble men", using the terminology of Confucius, see chapter 2 below

[5] didactic principles represent here the enmorphya of the relation between the substrate (heads of the students) and the property (the subject matter to be taught), see [1], chap. 3.

[6] This work contains all the information needed to follow this presentation; use of the references can be helpful for readers interested in a *more detailed justification* of one or other thesis.

knowledge and skills - can be achieved by using <u>different</u> didactic principles and methods. Each individual didactic approach forms a specific *relation* between students and the material being taught.

Thus, the *relation* between the subject of the effort (substrate, matter) and the character of that effort (property, information) is specific to each given decision (on which approach / principle shall be applied). Therefore, the wider the range of possible decisions, the more there are such specific relations between the substrate and the properties, i.e. between matter and information.

This means, among other things, that the less restrictive factors on the opportunities to make decisions, the more diverse the process of interaction between material and ideal objects.

It should be noted that the cause of "the diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects" is an inherent indeterminacy of decisions as to which of the opportunities is to actually realise[7].
On the other hand, it is indeterministic (stochastic) decision-making that contributes to entropy production, thereby minimizing the consumption of Nature's resources[8].

Therefore, the degree of "the diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects" is directly related to the consumption of Nature's resources: the maximum achievable "diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects" corresponds to the minimum consumption of Nature's resources.
It is exactly the minimisation of the consumption of Nature's resources, which <u>causes</u> that "diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects" <u>is the sense</u> of existence of biological (self-organising) systems[9]. Thus, to minimise the consumption of its resources, Nature strives for greater "diversifying": it minimizes the number of factors, for example ethical, limiting the opportunities of decisions making.

The following chain of dependencies can be derived from the observation above: Nature minimizes its consumption of resources (this is the main principle of its development, its enmorphya[10]), which is achieved by the maximum possible "diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects", which in turn is realized by minimizing restrictions on the opportunities of decision making:

The fewer restrictions (ethical, ideological, etc.) on choice, the less resources Nature consumes.

Consequently, **people with a minimum of (ethical, ideological and other) restrictions** ("petty people" according to Confucius) are **natural and expected elements of humanity** and therefore **most common**.

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[7] It should be noted that biological systems make their decisions in an indeterministic way, though they represent macroscopic (non-quantum, dissipative) systems; see [2], chap. 3
[8] [3], chapter 2.3
[9] Concretely, this is done through the creation of ideal and material artefacts, i.e. for human beings - through mental and labour activity, respectively, Furgel, 2002.
[10] [3], chapter 2.3

Then the next question arises: For what do we need "noble men" (according to Confucius) at all?

Their ethical and other principles limit their freedom of choice, i.e. their freedom of making decisions, and thus limit the contribution of these people to the "diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects". It seems that the existence of "noble men" contradicts the Principle of Least Resources Consumption in Nature. Is this really so?

"Noble men", whose freedom of choice is limited by ethical and other principles, constitute - precisely by these principles - the *structural factor*[11] of human society, i.e. the relations within society which correspond to the characteristics of the members of society.

In turn, the organization of people in a society - thanks to the division of labour and duties within the society - reinforces the "diversifying of the process of interaction between material and ideal objects" and therefore promotes the minimization of consumption of Nature's resources.

Thus, in the language of systems theory[12], "petty people" (according to Confucius) represent the *substrate* of human society as a system; on the other hand, "noble men" with their ethical and other norms, are the creators/carriers/enforcers[13] of the *structural factor* of society[14]. The *system-constituting concept* of society is additional (in terms of self-protection) protection (i) of the basic existence of the members of society and (ii) of individuals from the death anxiety (existential fear)[15].

It is precisely this <u>systemic</u> separation of the functions of "petty" and "noble" people in society that answers the question posed at the beginning: "What does the distribution of these categories of people look like in society and what does it depend on? Does this distribution of categories of people represent a stable state within society?"

There should be as many "petty people" as possible, without pronounced ethical and other restrictions (the substrate of society), in order to diversify as much as possible the "process of interaction between material and ideal objects". In this way, Nature's consumption of resources is minimized. Of "noble men" - the structural factor of society - there should be exactly as many and not more than necessary to maintain a stable existence of society as a system.

Also Confucius placed the responsibility for maintaining order in the Celestial Empire precisely on the noble man. Who then can claim that such a coincidence is contingency? :)

In summary, the main characteristic of "petty people" is that they follow <u>the minimally possible set of norms</u>, which is necessary and sufficient for them to fulfil their role in the society as its *substrate*. This characteristic implies the greatest possible behavioural opportunism (see definition in Chapter 6). Thus, <u>the opportunism of behaviour</u> is <u>a necessary and very likely the sufficient attribute of the "petty man"</u>. Confucius also says: "The common man is well versed in profit".

The main characteristic of "noble men" is that they follow the smallest possible set of norms,

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[11] see glossary, chapter 6

[12] in the sense introduced by A.I. Uemov, see glossary in chapter 6

[13] DE: Urheber/Träger/Vollstrecker; RU: создатели/носители/обеспечители

[14] The structural factor of a society is communication in the broadest sense of the word, see [1], chapter 4.1

[15] [1], chap. 4.1, System Hierarchy of Society

which is necessary and sufficient for the fulfilment of their social role as creators/carriers/enforcers of the *structural factor* of society. The main function of "noble men" in society is to be its norm-setting element. Confucius says: "The noble man is well versed in duty". To what extent this function is demanded by a concrete society depends on that society, see Chapter 3 below.

According to this, the stratification of society into the *substrate* ("petty people") and the *structure factor* ("noble men") is based on statistical necessity because it is a direct consequence of the principle of the least resources consumption by Nature.

2 Confucius, Heidegger and the self-identification of a person

The other question that arises in this context is: Can it be that there is a certain correlation between Heidegger's Dasein's modes of being (see [5]) and the two categories of people according to Confucius?

The ordinary mode[16] ⇔ "petty man",

The ontological mode[17] ⇔ "noble man".

In particular, Heidegger's references to the ordinary mode have a significant overlap with Confucius' characteristics of the "petty man"[18].

For the ontological mode, I have found very few references[19]; however, even they would rather speak for the correlation with the "noble man", especially the questioning of the meaning of being, because exactly the questioning of the meaning of being leads to the fact that the questioner necessarily comes to a set of norms and thus becomes the creator/carrier/enforcer of the *structural factor* of a society.

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[16] DE: alltäglicher Modus; RU: обыденный (повседневный) модус

[17] DE: ontologischer Modus; RU: онтологический модус

[18] the corresponding references are spread over [5]: §6, §11, ch. 4 and many others; only as an example from §6: «Die vorbereitende Interpretation der Fundamentalstrukturen des Daseins hinsichtlich seiner nächsten und durchschnittlichen Seinsart, in der es mithin auch zunächst geschichtlich ist, wird aber folgendes offenbar machen: das Dasein hat nicht nur die Geneigtheit, an seine Welt, in der es ist, zu verfallen und reluzent aus ihr her sich auszulegen, Dasein verfällt in eins damit auch seiner mehr oder minder ausdrücklich ergriffenen Tradition. Diese nimmt ihm die eigene Führung, das Fragen und Wählen ab. Das gilt nicht zuletzt von dem Verständnis und seiner Ausbild-barkeit, das im eigensten Sein des Daseins verwurzelt ist, dem ontologischen.»

"Our preparatory Interpretation of the fundamental structures of Dasein with regard to the average kind of Being which is closest to it (a kind of Being in which it is therefore proximally historical as well), will make manifest, however, not only that Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its world (the world in which it is) and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light, but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold. This tradition keeps it from providing its own guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing. This holds true - and by no means least - for that understanding which is rooted in Dasein's ownmost Being, and for the possibility of developing it - namely, for ontological understanding." – translation from German by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1962

[19] cite only one reference, [5], §6: «Hat andererseits das Dasein die in ihm liegende Möglichkeit ergriffen, nicht nur seine Existenz sich durchsichtig zu machen, sondern dem Sinn der Existenzialität selbst, d. h. vorgängig dem Sinn des Seins überhaupt nachzufragen, und hat sich in solchem Fragen der Blick für die wesentliche Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins geöffnet, dann ist die Einsicht unumgänglich: das Fragen nach dem Sein, das hinsichtlich seiner ontisch-ontologischen Notwendigkeit angezeigt wurde, ist selbst durch die Geschichtlichkeit charakterisiert.»
„On the other hand, if Dasein has seized upon its latent possibility not only of making its own existence transparent to itself but also of inquiring into the meaning of existentiality itself (that is to say, of previously inquiring into the meaning of Being in general) , and if by such inquiry its eyes have been opened to its own essential historicality, then one cannot fail to see that the inquiry into Being (the ontico-ontological necessity of which we have already indicated) is itself characterized by historicality." – translation from German by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1962

Another parallel (or even equivalence) that comes to mind here is related to the *self-identification of a person.*

We distinguish two *complementary* types of these:

1) self-identification through what a person performs/achieves by him- or herself, what he or she able to do, and
2) self-identification through the affiliation of a person to a group/environment, through his or her (formal or informal) "membership": locality, denomination, company, club, association, other external attributes.

The totality of what a person can create/achieve by him- or herself[20] makes up the content, the inside, the essence, the being (DE: das Sein; RU: сущность) of this person. That is, **the persons whose self-identification takes place through their own performance identify themselves through their being (through what they are)**. We call this type of self-identification *the Being-self-identification*[22].

A person's affiliation to a group/environment, his or her (formal or informal) "membership" means, in abstract terms, the possession of an affiliation: state (citizenship), local (locality), confessional, belonging-to-a-group-of-Blue-eyed-people, etc.; i.e. this means having a set of external attributes ttributes. The possession of a set of external attributes is a manifestation of the predicate "to have". Consequently, **persons, whose self-identification takes place through their affiliation, identify themselves through their having (through what they have)**. We call this type of self-identification *the Having-self-identification*[23].

The persons with the *Being-self-identification* must necessarily ask the question-of-**what** (what I am able to do, what have I performed/achieved/created, what am I, what makes me up), so that they can self-identify themselves in exactly this way and not in any other way. This means that these persons must necessarily be in the "ontological mode" according to Heidegger.
The persons with *Having-self-identification* must necessarily ask the question-of-**how** (how do I look, how do I behave, how do I present myself, how is this perceived by my reference group - will this ensure my group membership?), so that they can self-identify themselves in exactly this way and not in any other way. This means that these persons must necessarily be in the "ordinary mode" according to Heidegger.

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[20] in the broadest sense of the notion "achieve, perform", including all material and non-material artefacts, including relationships with other people and with objects, etc.

[22] *DE: Sein-Selbstidentifikation, RU: Самоидентификация-по-Сущности*
[23] *DE: Haben-Selbstidentifikation, RU: Самоидентификация-по-Обладанию*

We therefore establish the following equivalence:

Having-self-identification ⇔ "ordinary mode" acc. to Heidegger ⇔ "petty man" acc. to Confucius,

Being-self-identification ⇔ "ontological mode" acc. to Heidegger ⇔ "noble man" acc. to Confucius.

This equivalence makes it obvious that the content of the terms "petty man" and "noble man", which were introduced by Confucius 2,500 years ago, should be made more precise. These two terms contain an attribute, an assessment - "petty" and "noble", whereas Heidegger's terms and those of self-identification do not have any assessments.

Based on the recognition that any assessments can represent the elements of subjective or societal knowledge, but have no place in the adequate knowledge[24], we will remove the emotionally coloured assessments from the terms "petty man" and "noble man" and interpret these terms neutrally in the following.

Confucius' choice of emotionally coloured terms was apparently related to his plea - on the political level - for the achievement of the prosperity of the state and its citizens through "good", "noble" leadership of the state and its institutions[25].

The "petty man" is obviously the "common man"[26], see chapter 1 and Appendix in chapter 9.

The "noble man" - as creator/carrier/enforcer of the *structural factor* of society and therefore as its norm-setting element - is the "leadership personality"[27], see chapter 1 and Appendix in chapter 9.

The use of the terms "common man" and "leadership personality" instead of the Confucian "petty man" and "noble man" deprives the latter of the inadequately-emotional colouring while preserving its essential content.

It should be noted that a "leadership personality", if he or she has the appropriate resources, can carry out adequate or inadequate norm-setting in a socium (see glossary in chapter 6). This norm-setting can be "one man's joy, another man's suffering" in this socium, while the term "noble man" emotionally implies only the norm-setting of "one man's joy" and overshadows the norm-setting of "another man's suffering".

In further consideration we use the terms "common man" and "leadership personality" instead of "petty man" and "noble man", respectively.

We want to point out again that "common man" and "leadership personality" represent <u>categories of people</u>, completely independent of the social background and social status of their bearers; i.e. the representatives of these categories can occur in social "lower classes" as well as in "upper classes".

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[24] see chap. 4

[25] cf. *The Allegory of Good and Bad Government*, Ambrogio Lorenzetti, 1338-1339, Palazzo Pubblico of Siena

[26] RU: обыкновенный человек; DE: gemeiner Mensch

[27] RU: личность с лидерскими качествами, авторитетная личность; DE: Führungspersönlichkeit

3 Cognitive empathy

Based on the conclusions in Chapter 1, we asked ourselves whether there is a correlation between a person's quality of being a "common man" and their degree of cognitive empathy (see Glossary in Chapter 6).

On the one hand, the defining feature of being an "common man", i.e. the substrate of society, is the absence of pronounced ethical and other restrictions: the fewer restrictions (ethical, ideological, etc.) on choice, the less resources Nature consumes, see Chap. 1.

On the other hand, pronounced cognitive empathy, i.e. the ability to put oneself in the other's place, requires a significant expenditure of effort, resources in the process of this "putting oneself in the other's place": indeed, in order to understand the other's approach and point of view, one must understand and - at least temporarily, virtually - accept the other's position, his or her situation (motives, logic of action, previous experience, future prospects). This means that it is necessary to virtually accept part of the system-constituting concept and of the structural factor of the other's cognitive system. This process of virtual acceptance of a part of the system-constituting concept and of the structural factor of the other's cognitive system requires significant expenditure of resources, as it requires virtual renunciation of one's own habitual cognitive system.
The need for significant expenditure of resources in this context, in turn, contradicts the universal principle of the Least Resources Consumption.

In addition, the result of "putting yourself in the other's place" can significantly limit your own freedom of choice: indeed, if I - even partially - understood the position and vision of the other, they become part of my knowledge. Consequently, I take them volens-nolens into account to a greater or lesser extent and thus increase the restrictions of my choices. The increase in the restriction of choice leads - in a statistically significant mass of events - to an increase in the consumption of Nature's resources and is in direct contradiction to the determinative property of "common man" - his opportunism, see Chap. 1.

Therefore, there must (and does) exist a direct correlation between the property of being a 'common man' and the degree of the expression of his cognitive empathy:

Cognitive empathy in a "common man" is weakly pronounced.

It is important to note that both properties of being a "common man" and having a low degree of the expression of cognitive empathy are independent of each other consequences of the general principle of Least Resources Consumption.

Similar reasoning and conclusions are also valid for emotional empathy. However, the correlation between a person's quality to be a "common man" and the low degree of emotional empathy is not as pronounced.

The reason for this is the very limited number of types of emotions (love, fear, pity, hatred,

indifference, anger, etc.) experienced by the statistical majority of people. This leads to the fact that the emotional systems of the statistical majority of people have a lot in common with regard to the number of types of emotions they experience. This statement is especially valid when it concerns any widespread emotional situation in a given society: promotion, receiving a valuable gift / unexpected income, serious illness, loss of a close person, loss of property, etc.

Since the emotional systems of the statistical majority of people are similar in the above respect, it is only necessary to spend a minimum of resources in order to feel the emotion of the other, i.e. to virtually accept a part of the system-constituting concept and of the structural factor of the emotional system of the other, as it practically does not require virtual renunciation of one's own habitual emotional system.

4 Norm-setting in a socium and the role of social networks

The term "socium" is explained in the glossary in chapter 6.

The next question we ask is as follows: How should this norm setting in a socium by "leaders" work?

In general, this shall be done by promoting "leaders" to appropriate positions in socium, in which they possess sufficient resources to set norms and ensure their enforcing. We will call such positions in socium *authoritative*.

It should be noted that *authoritative positions* in a socium are not people, but elements of the structure of this socium within its institutions; i.e. *authoritative positions* are established by the system-constituting concept of this socium (e.g. by constitution, statute, charter, etc.) and are supported by its institutions (e.g. president, minister, chair/secretary of a community, etc.). *Authoritative positions* are occupied/released by various concrete people, who can be both "leaders" and "common people".

Concrete mechanisms of advancing to *authoritative positions* depend both on the concrete socium (a society as a whole, a company, a closed society (monastery, club, etc.)[28]) and on the concrete historical period, in which the socium is. Each formal socium should adopt a statute (constitution, rules of procedure)[29,30] according to which it functions. This statute should, among other things, define the procedures of promoting to appropriate *authoritative positions*.

This claim is also true for a society organised as a state. In such a society the

- Legislative,
- Judiciary,
- Executive and
- Educative

represent the following institutions, respectively[31]:

- norm-setting,
- norm-saving,
- norm-enforcing and
- norm-propagating.

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[28] A socium from animals is also expected to show similar trends

[29] So-called primary legislation (DE: Primärrecht, RU: первичное законодательство), i.e. the establishment of procedures for dealing with matters.

[30] DE: Verfassung, Geschäftsordnung, Satzung; RU: конституция, регламент.

[31] s. [7], chapter 4

How these institutions are organized in a concrete society depends on the current political system that this society has established. The basic order of establishing the institutions of a society is usually set out in the constitution, which regulates the procedures of nominating candidates for *authoritative positions* such as the electoral system or the transfer of *authoritative positions* according to the principle of inheritance, etc. The party-internal statutory documents regulate the procedures for nominating candidates for *authoritative positions* within a political party, etc.

In order to ensure the stability and viability of any formal socium, including a state[32], the procedures for promoting to *authoritative positions* should ensure that predominantly "leaders" move up to these positions, because it is precisely this type of person - thanks to their adherence to ethical and other principles - that is the norm-setting element of a society, see Chapter 1.

If the current rules of procedure of a socium is inefficient, i.e. if the application of the rules of procedure leads in the medium term to a situation that *authoritative positions* are occupied not by "leaders", but by "common people", such a socium becomes unstable and may even eventually cease to exist as a system, i.e. it may disintegrate.

> That is precisely why the <u>procedures</u> of nominating candidates for *authoritative positions* - among other factors - play a central role in the long-term stability of any socium, including a society.

There is another interesting question in this context: "Can commonly accessible social networks (including, for example, platforms for user/reader comments) influence norm-setting procedures in a socium? "

One of the peculiarities of social networks, which is important for this question, is the possibility of publishing one's own point of view, including one's own ethical views, and making it accessible to a large, theoretically unlimited number of members of the social community. This opens up the technical possibility for every interested person, incl. the "common people", to *communicate (make accessible)* his own ethical and other norms in the Sozium without limitation.
However, *communicating* norms does not mean that they are automatically *set* and *enforced*.
The situation, where a widely *accessible* norm of an individual (the "broadcaster"[33]), who does not have an *authoritative position*, is thus echoed by his "listeners", seems possible and even likely. This is only possible if this norm of the "broadcaster" is close to the corresponding norms of his "listeners" / "recipients" or is at least not alien to them.

Can it be said that the "broadcaster" *sets* the norm in this case? Yes, one can: he or she sets the norm by naming it, verbalizing it.

However, simple *setting* a norm is not enough to fill an *authoritative position*. For this, there is still not enough resource to *ensure its enforcement*. Being only a member of social networks, the "broadcaster" cannot *ensure that the norm is enforced*, and thus cannot take an *authoritative position*, because a social network is essentially unable to provide it. The reason for this is precisely that social networks do not provide a resource for enforcing a norm.

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[32] independent of the specific organisation of its institutions
[33] DE: Sender; RU: вещатель

However, if the norm, which has found an echo among several people, has been *set* by its designation, it can (and will) become effective from the inner motivation (conviction) of its numerous carriers. This means that its establishment in the socium does not require any <u>external</u> conviction (external motivation) for *ensuring its enforcing* and, consequently, no *authoritative position* for this.

In this case, the *authoritative position* is not occupied by a „leadership personality", but by <u>the entire socium</u> that shares this norm. We call such a socium *norm-setting socium*. And this *norm-setting socium* does not have to have any typical characteristics of the „leadership personality".

A single norm can easily find an echo with many. However, the greater the number of norms, the lower the ability of the members of a socium to agree on the <u>totality</u> of these norms, and the smaller their <u>area of mutual understanding</u> in relation to them, i.e. the less likely it is in this case that the *norm-setting socium* will emerge.

The „leadership personality", who is in an *authoritative position*, has an obvious advantage in this respect compared to the *norm-setting socium*: it is much easier for him to agree with himself on a large number of norms.

> Consequently, a *norm-setting socium*, if it is emerged, *sets* and *enforces* only a very limited number of norms (ones in the number), whereas the „leadership personality", when occupying an *authoritative position*, *sets* and *enforces* a large set of norms (in any case, a set sufficient for the long-term stability of society).
> Although egalitarian social networks do directly influence norm-setting procedures in a socium, they are unable to build consensus on a complex set of norms. A set of norms sufficient for the long-term stability of society can only be *set* and *enforced* by a „leadership personality", i.e. a person who acts according to his or her principles and occupies an *authoritative position*.

5 Conclusion

1. Answering the questions - "What is the distribution of these categories of people[34] in society and what does it depend on? Does this distribution of categories of people represent a stable state within the framework of society?" - has led us to the understanding that the stratification of society into the *substrate* ("common people") and the *structural factor* ("leadership personalities") is not accidental, but is based on statistical necessity, because it is a direct consequence of the principle of the least resources consumption by Nature.

The main characteristic of "common people" is the immanent <u>opportunism</u> of their behaviour; the main characteristic of "leadership personalities" is that they act in accordance with their principles, including ethical ones.
The central social function of "leadership personalities" is to be their <u>norm-setting</u> element. To what extent this function is demanded by a concrete society depends on that society, see §3 below.

2. Further considerations have shown that the categorisation of personalities according to Confucius and Heidegger is directly related to two complementary types of self-identification of a person:
(i) to the being-self-identification (self-identification through what a person performs/achieves <u>by him- or herself</u>, what <u>he or she</u> able to do), and
(ii) to the having-self-identification (the self-identification by the <u>affiliation</u> of a person to a group/environment, through his or her "membership": locality, denomination, company, club, association or other external attributes).
In this context, we determine the following equivalence:

> Having-self-identification ⇔ "ordinary mode" acc. to Heidegger ⇔ "common man" ("petty man" acc. to Confucius),
> Being-self-identification ⇔ "ontological mode" acc. to Heidegger ⇔ "leadership personality" ("noble man" acc. to Confucius).

In this context, it is hardly possible not to recall Juvenal and his "panem et circenses! "(bread and games!). The call "bread!" expresses the <u>behavioural opportunism</u> of the "common man" - to get something (bread) just like so, without effort. The call "games!" expresses the "common man's" having-self-identification: in fact, spectacles, especially games and competitions between representatives of different groups, promote the self-identification of followers by their <u>belonging</u> to one of the groups in competition.
"Bread and games!" thus means "the behavioural opportunism and the having-self-identification" of the "common man".

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[34] "petty men" and "noble men", using the terminology of Confucius, see chapter 2 below

3 The third question that we have looked into is: How should the norm-setting in a socium by the "leadership personalities" work?

In general, this should be done by promoting "leadership personalities" to corresponding positions in the socium (we call them *authoritative positions*), where they have sufficient resources to set norms and ensure their enforcement, because this very type of person is - thanks to their adherence to ethical and other principles - the norm-setting element of a society, see § 1 above.

We came to the conclusion that if the application of the statute of a socium (e.g. the constitution of a society) leads in the medium term to a situation that not "leadership personalities" but "common people" occupy *authoritative positions*, such a socium becomes unstable and may ultimately even cease to exist as a system, i.e. it may disintegrate. This is precisely why the procedures for filling *authoritative positions* play a central role in the long-term stability of a society.

Furthermore, it has been found that generally accessible social networks (including, for example, platforms for user/reader comments) directly influence norm-setting procedures in a socium.

A norm that has been *set* by its "broadcaster" by its designation and has found an echo with several "listeners" will become effective from the inner conviction of its numerous bearers. This means that its establishment in the socium does not require any <u>external</u> conviction (external motivation) for *ensuring its enforcing* and, consequently, no *authoritative position* for this.

In this case, the *authoritative position* is not occupied by a "leadership personality", but by <u>the entire socium</u> that shares this norm. We called this as the *norm-setting socium*. A *norm-setting socium* does not have to have any typical characteristics of the "leadership personality".

Further considerations have shown that a *norm-setting socium*, if it is emerged, *sets* and *enforces* only a very limited number of norms (ones in the number), whereas the "leadership personality", when occupying an *authoritative position*, *sets* and *enforces* a large set of norms (in any case, one sufficient for long-term stability of society).

This means that although egalitarian social networks directly influence norm-setting procedures in a socium, they are unable to reach consensus on a complex set of norms. A set of norms sufficient for the long-term stability of society can only be *set* and *enforced* by a "leadership personality", i.e. a person who acts according to his or her principles and occupies an *authoritative position*.

6 Glossary

This chapter gives the main terms of system theory, which are necessary for reading this thesis, see Уемов А. И. *Системный подход и общая теория систем*, М.: Наука, 1978, с авторским послесловием, 2006[35].

System	any given entity, at which a *relation* is implemented, which has an arbitrarily chosen certain *property*. Or the equivalent: any given entity, at which some *properties* are implemented, which are in an arbitrarily chosen certain *relation*.
System-constituting concept[36]	a priori given system constituting *property* or *relation*; Depending on this, the system-constituting concept is an *attributive* or *relational one*.
Structure factor[37]	A set of properties and relations that satisfy the given system-constituting concept. Structural factor can be relational (in the case of the attributive concept) and attributive (in the case of the relational concept).
Substrate of the system[38]	A carrier of the relational or attributive structure.
Cognitive empathy	The capacity to understand another's point of view / perspective (thoughts, intentions and motives). It also includes the ability to correctly decode indirect or non-verbal messages (body language). In contrast to emotional empathy, cognitive empathy is a conscious process that participates in shaping verbal communication and meaning.
Socium	The term "Socium" means a social entity / unit, a group of people, a socially connected system of interacting sub-units, a society of any size held together by any internal relationships.
Opportunism	Great readiness to adapt to any situation for utilitarian considerations. Use: in educational language. Source: Duden (https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Opportunismus#Bedeutung1)[39]

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[35] A. Uemov *System approach and general system theory*, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, with author's postscript, 2006
[36] the original term by Uemov: 'системообразующий концепт'
[37] the original term by Uemov: 'структурный фактор'
[38] the original term by Uemov: 'субстрат системы'
[39] **Opportunismus**: Allzu bereitwillige Anpassung an die jeweilige Lage aus Nützlichkeitserwägungen.
    Gebrauch: bildungssprachlich

7 References

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[2]   *Human.Animate.Inanimate*, v.1.02, I. Furgel, German National Library (DNB), http://d-nb.info/1164297767https://d-nb.info/1213939461/, https://d-nb.info/1213939461/34, 2020

[3]   *Complementarity of the Deterministic Past and the Probabilistic Future as the Nature Evolution Source,* I. Furgel, Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (DNB), http://d-nb.info/995850909, 2009

[4]   *Системные аспекты философского знания*, Уемов А.И., Одесса, 2000[40]

[5]   *Sein und Zeit*, M. Heidegger, 19. Auflage, 2006[41]

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8 Acknowledgements

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[40] A. I. Uemov *Systemic Aspects of Philosophical Knowledge*, Odessa, 2000
[41] *Being and Time*, M. Heidegger, 19th edition, 2006

9 Annex

Selected characteristics of "noble men"[42] and "common (petty, mean, inferior) men"[43], which Confucius ascribed them:

The noble man understands righteousness; the common man understands profit.

Nine things it is that the noble man pays careful attention to:

- When seeing, he pays attention to clarity,

- when listening, for clearness,

- in his face for kindness,

- he pays attention to politeness in behaviour,

- in speaking on honesty,

- in acting on conscientiousness.

- When he has doubts, he asks others.

- When he is in anger, he considers the consequences.

- In view of a personal advantage, he wonders whether he is also entitled to it.

The noble man has peace of mind and serenity; the common man is always full of restlessness and excitement.
The noble man is well versed in duty, the common man is well versed in profit.
The noble man waits with dignity at heaven's bidding, the common man hastily waits for happiness.
The morality of the noble is like the wind; the morality of the common is like the grass. The grass always bends in whatever direction the wind blows over it.[44]
The noble man accuses himself, the common man accuses others.
The noble man makes demands on himself, the common man - on other people.
The noble man gets along with everyone, the common man seeks his own kind. (The noble man is conciliatory, but not accommodating, the common man is accommodating, but not conciliatory.)
The noble man knows of his nobleity, but avoids rivalry. He gets along with everyone, but conspires with no one.
The noble man does not strive for satiety at mealtimes, nor for pomp in the home.
The noble man does not expect deception from anyone, but if he is deceived, he is the first to know.
The noble man helps his fellow men to bring the good in them to maturity, but not the bad. The common man does the opposite.

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[42] CHI: 君子 *(jūnzǐ)*

[43] CHI: 小人 (*xiǎorén*)

[44] In another context: When a prince asked him whether the one, who transgressed the laws, should be killed, Confucius replied: "If Your Highness exercises the government, what is the need for killing? If Your Highness desires the good, the people will become good. The essence of the ruler is like wind. The essence of the petty is like grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows over it."

The noble man takes wrath and mercy from rulers with equal dignity.
The noble man who prefers domestic comfort is unworthy to be called noble.
The noble man remains firmly in trouble, the common man gets out of hand in trouble.